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ABSTRACT 
We  show  that, under certain  regularity conditions, if the distribution of income 
IS  price independent  and  satisfies  a  condition  on  the shape of its graph,  then total 
market demand,  F(p),  is  monotone,  i.e.,  given  two  positive prices p,  and q,  one has 
(p - q) . (F(p) - F(q)) < O.  Similar assumptions on  the distributions of endowments, 
yield a restricted monotonicity property on aggregate excess demand, where, now, wealth 
is  determined  by  market prices.  This is  enough,  however,  to obtain  uniqueness and 
stability of equilibrium for  our Walrasian pure exchange model. 
3 1  INTRODUCTION 
A satisfactory theory lillkillg the kllOWll  microecollomic features of consumers and 
the assumed macroecollomic properties of aggregated systems is still missing.  The major 
stumblillg block  to filI  the gap  between  these two  fields,  is  how  to find  a  way  around 
Sonnenscheill's indeterminéLcy  theorem.  Sonnenschein's ([15,  16,  17])  result states that 
ally  continuolls,  mapping that satisfies  Walras'  law  and  is  homogeneous  of degree  O, 
coincides with the excess demalld function of a certain economy. 
This  has  some  unpleasant  consequences.  One of  these,  is  that it permits the 
theoretical possibility of many equilibria.  Furthermore, it questions the regularity (in 
terms of smoothlless,  like differentiability) of market demand and the stability of the 
equilibrium prices. 
The problem of smoothness of market demand was  satisfactorily attacked in [4]. 
The authors there show  that convelliently  dispersed  distributions of preferences and 
wealth  lead  to a  continuous  01'  even  el demand function.  The interested reader is 
referred  to [18]  for  a  survey on  market  demand  in  large  economies  with  non-convex 
preferences and for  instaures in  which  aggregation has a smoothiug effect. 
Two main lines of research  have dealt with  the remaining issues. i.e.  umqueness 
and stability uf equilibriulll prices.  One of them was  initiated by  W.  Hildenbrand ([9]) 
and developed by  W.  Hardle. W.  Hildenbrand and  M.  Jerison in  [8].  The gist of their 
method is  to put restrictious uu  the shapc of the distribution of income.  The upshot 
of this  approach  is  that one obtains  that market demand is  monotone (see Section 
below).  In particular, this implies that market demand for  a particular commodity is a 
decreasing function of its priee. ami  that the weak  axiom of revealed preference holds 
for  the aggregatt>. 
However,  the restrictions  imposed  are rather stringent:  Firstly, income is  price 
5 ·independent.  Moreover, it is  assllllled that the dis,tribution of income has a continuous 
.  . 
non-increasing density with bOUllded  support. 
With respect to the first  assumption, it has  been  extended to the case in which 
individual endowments are collinear ([9],[1:3]).  In  [1],  the second assumption has been 
relaxed, to other types of densities for  the case of identical consumers the Engel curves 
of whom have a specific functional formo 
A second  line  uf  argument  has  beell  put forth  by  .1.  M.  Grandmont  ([5]).  His 
approach is to impose rest.rictiolls on  the ,<;hapt:  01 t/tr agents' chamcteristics rather than 
on the distributioll 01'  income.  In  his  work  the use of a very particular linear structure 
on the space of demand functions, named the a-transform, is essential. 
As a result the author proves very nice properties of the aggregate demand: market 
demalld has a dominant diagonal .Jacobian matrix and aggregate excess demand has the 
gross substituability property.  It follows  then that there is  a unique equilibrium which 
is globally stable under the usual tatonnement process. 
There are still some unsatisfactory features in the aforementioned viewpoint:  One 
of them is  that the way  the a-transform is  used  does  not have a straightforward eco-
nomics illterpretation. 
Further, the so-ca11ed  hypothesis of  agg1"f'.gatc  dcsirability  which  also appears in 
a  critical way,  in  the said  \\'ol"k,  is  not  sa.tisfied  hy  Illally  01'  the wOl"king  examples of 
demand models  (e.g.  CES,  Diewert  01"  Addilog).  Even  though  one could argue that 
it rnay  not  be met individualIy and yet  hold  in  the aggregate,  it certainly puts sorne 
constraints on the type of demalld functiolls allowed. 
The present work  goes  back  to the first  formulatioll.  The key  idea is  again  to 
control the "pathologies" of the illcome term in  Slutskyls e<luation 
DF(p) =  8(p) - A(p), 
6 where DF is the .Jacobia:n inatl'ix uf mean demand, S' ·is the ave~age  Sluts~y cornpensated 
.  . 
matrix and A  is  the average  inconw matl'ix.  We  do  this by  way  of conditions in  the 
shape of eithel' illcome 01' initial endowments. 
The novelty  is  twofold:  First, in  the case of price independent wealth, we  allow 
for  sorne increasing densities  while  the  Law  of Demand still  holds  for  all  prices.  In 
particular, our result applies to some subfamily of lognormal distributions. 
Secondly. for the case of pUl'e mal'ket exchange economies, we obtain uniqueness of 
price equilibrium all(llocal stability fol'  the unique equilibrium, when initial endowrnents 
need not be necessarily collineal'. 
If one imposes  a  further  restriction  on  individual  demand functions,  then it  lS 
possible to obtain global stability of the unique equilibrium. 
Dne further characteristic of our present work, already present in  [5],  is  that the 
rnatrix A  does  not  need  to  be  positive semidefinite,  i.e.  it may have some negative 
eigenvalues.  "Ve do make use however of the hypothesis that S is negative sernidefinite. 
The papel' is organized as follows.  In Section 2,  we study the problern of aggrega-
tion demand for  a model in  which  income is  indepelldent of prices.  We introduce the 
notion of metonymy, which  was  airead)' present in  the work  of W.  Hardle. W.  Hilden-
brand and 1\L  .Jerison  ([8])  alld  is  also essential in  the present one. 
We pro\'e that if the the shape of tlw density of the distribution of income satisfies 
a certain restriction, the Law of Demand holds fol'  all  prices. 
Essentially the same pl'oof shows  that it is  possible to obtaill  the monotonicity 
of market demand fOf all  prices by  imposing that the second eigellvalue of the Slutsky 
compellsated  tel'm  be stl'ictly  negative  <1..-;  l)l'ices  go  to  the  boulldary  of the positive 
orthant,  rOl'  at  least  one  agellt  iu  t,he  enmomy.  This  is  a  conditioll  on  consurners' 
i preferences.  It is  satisfied,  for  example. if tlwre  i~ at least one  C()'ll~umer:  w.ith  a  CES 
utility function. 
In  Section :3  \Ve  apply these ideas to the setting in  which income is  determined by 
the market price of initial endowments.  The Law  of Demand cannot hold in  this case. 
However,  a limited version of it can  be  shown,  and this restricted variation is  enough 
to yield  uniqueness.  By  strengthenillg the assumptions,  the weak  axiom of revealed 
preference in  the aggregate follows. 
These properties 01' total Illal'ket dt'IlHI,lld  haVt'  éL  countel'part in  the stability of the 
model un del' a  "Walrasian auctioneer"  mechanisl11. 
This research  \Vas  mostly conduded during a stay at the U.  of Bielefeld.  Thanks 
are due to the Illstitut für  Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung for  their hospitality.  I 
am especially grateful to W.  Trockel  who  introduced me into this interesting subject. 
Without his help and advice this research would  not have beell possible. 
Support from  my  colleagues at the Ulliversity  of Alicante is  also  gratefully ac-
knowledged.  Particularly, f)'om  C.  Herrero and L.  Corchón, fo)'  advice and discussions. 
One of the early drafts benefited, as  welI,  f)'OIll  conversations with some of the partic-
ipants at the Bonn  Workshop  92.  1 am glad  to acknowledge very helpful suggestions 
from J. M.  Grandmont éLnd  M ..  Jerison. 
In order to facilitatf' the reading all  the proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The 
reader is  referred  tht'n~ also  for  au  f'XplalléLtioll  of the  llotation  llsed  through out this 
work. 
2  MARKET DEMAND 
We  consider an economy with n goods ami  éL  colltinuum of agellts.  Consumers will  be 
8 distinguished frOlll  each other by  their preferences ami  incm;n~, which. for  the moment 
,  .  . 
wiII  be assum'ed' to  be exogeneously given.  Typically, the chai'acteristics of each age~t 
in  the economy will  be determined by  his individual demand function and income. 
Definition 2.1  An individual df1nand fundíon is a (¡l mapping f : R~+  x ~  -t  R~, 
satisfying the foll01lling  propc1'tic:s: 
(i)  Budget ídentity: p' f(p, w) = tu; 
(ii)  Wcak  Axiom of Rf'vralf'd  Pn'/frC1/,Cf:  for  fvcry  (p,'w)  and (p',w')  in  R~+ x~, 
p' . f(p, 'lo)  :S  w' implif's 1)' .f(,/. w')  ~ w. 
Here p E  IR.~+ denotes the vector of prices and w E ~  is  the consumer's budget. 
It follows  frolll  this  defillition  that individual dellland  functions  are homogeneous  of 
degree O in  (p, w).  We  note that dellland fUllctions  for  consumers are defined only for 
prices in the interior of the positive orthant. 
It is al so a well  known fact  that the axiolll of revealed preference as stated aboye 
implies that the Slutsky substitution lllatrix, S(p, lO),  with entries given by, 
af¡  af¡ 
'S¡i = ~  + -;:} fi 
vPi  vW 
(2.1 ) 
is  negative selllidefinite, i.e.  for  every  :1:  E  1Rn,  < 8(1',10):1:, x  >$ O.  The rank of the 
SIutsky lllatrix can  be at most  11.  - l.  sinc<~ 8(p, lO) . P =  O. 
Definition 2.2  A  n indi'"idual df11/.aJul fundion i..;;  ¡;(lid lo bf  1'(qular if it is continuously 
differentiablt: fo1' p E  IR.~+ and fo'/'  t""f1'Y (p, w)  E  IR.~+ x 114,  the Slutsky matriz S(p, w) 
is symmdric. 
Apart from differentiability of the demand functions, f(p, w), the other cooditioos 
can  be derived  if one  assumes  they  at'ise  from  cOlltinuous,  strictly convex  alld  oon-
saturated preferellce relations. 
9 We  will  assume that the .hehavior of  e~ch consumer is  described  by a. demand 
functioll  as in  the above definition  (which  may be taken as  the solution to the usual 
individual utility maximization problem) and an income level.  Here we assume income 
to  be exogenously  given  and  independent  of prices.  The general  case,  with  income 
depending on prices wiJI  be studied in  the next Section. 
A  market economy, say E, is  a  triple, ((A,IL),{f(a,·,·)}oE.A,W),  where (A,J.')  is 
a  Borel space,  f(a,·,·) is  an individual demand fUllction,  and, for each p E  R~+, the 
functioll  f(',p,w(')),  defined  un  A,  is  contilluous  ami  integrable,  i.e.,  f(·,p,w(·))  E 
V(A) n C(A).  The mapping w  :  A  --+  [{+, which  is  also  integrable alld  continuous, 
represents  the illcome  leve!  of each  consumero  Thus,  ror  each  O'  E  A,  the relevant 
economic features  of consumer  O'  are captured by  f(a,',') and w(a).  We  shall also 
assume the measure J.'  to he atomless and regular, assigning strictly positive measure to 
open su  bsets of A. 
In this contexto at a given price system p, total demand is defined by 
F(l') = L  f(  0',]>, w( 0') )d,L.  (2.2) 
We assume that this integral is fillite,  F(p), is differentiable and, furthermore, for 
p in the interior of the positive orthant we  have, 
aF  af 
-a·  (1') = { -:;-(a,p,w(a))d,L < oo. 
1'j  J.A  (/1'j 
(2.3) 
We sha11  enote by DF(1') the .Jacobian Illatrix of F at p. 
Definition 2.3  An  fC01LOmy  E  i~ st,itl lo  be:  n:!/,ulal' if 2.:1  holds tmd for all a  E A, the 
mappillg f(a,·,·) is a 1'fgula7' de:mand flludion. 
The Lau7 of Dcmalld is said to hold for the economy E. ir total demand F(,J) is monotone, 
i.e.  if for each p, q E  R~+, with JI  =F  q, 
(1' - q)' (F(p) - F(q)) < O.  (2.4) 
10 The Law  of  Demand  is  easily  obtained  if  it  holds  for  each  individual  Q  at aH 
budgets.  This  is  the  case~ for  exalúple,  if  individual  demand  functions  ~re derived 
from  homothetic preferences.  Another instance in  which  the Law  of Demand has been 
obtained,  [9],  is  for  economies  with  identical  consumers  and  a  decreasing  density of 
income.  These results havt> been extended in  [1]  to a.n  economy with identical consumers 
in which the Engel  curves can  be writtell as  L~=o  9k(p  )<Pk( w)  and the functions  <Pk( w) 
satisfy certain restrictions.  Economies with agents not necessarily identical have been 
studied in  [10],  agaill  ullder the assumption of a decreasing density of income. 
These may however be collsidered to be  very  restrictive cases.  Furthermore, they 
do not seem to apply easily to tht> case of income dependent on prices, unless aH endow-
ments are collinear.  In  this Section \Ve  wiU  be con cerned with other situations in which 
the Law  of Demand holds. 
RecaH  now  the 
Lernrna 2.4  Let G  be  a cont'  of In-iccs.  TIH:  follo'Wing  conditions arr equivalent 
(i)  Thf Jacobian  matl-ix DF(p) is  Ilfgatillf  semidrji.nite fOl'  each p E G. 
(ii)  For all pl'ÍCCS p, q E G,  (p - q). (F(p) - F(q)) :5 o. 
The proof is similar to the usual case (see [12]), so we will omit it here.  It is also a well 
known  fact  that the negative definiteness of D F(¡))  implies the strict lllonotonicity of 
total demand, F(p).  We  note, that the converse is  not trut'. 
For w  E  1R+,  define  B(w) = {n E  A  : w(n) = w}.  That is,  B(w) is  the set of 
consumers whose wealth is exactly w.  The measure l' induces conditional distributions 
r¡w  on B(w), for each w ami a probability measure. v on lf4 such that for any function 
h E  Ll(A,dl')~ 
f  lul,L = f  (f  hd7/.u )dll. 
lA  lH+  1 8 (111) 
11 Definition 2.5'  ([8])  The:  mcaSU1'C  JL  is  said to  bc  mc~o1Lymic if: 
(i)  The  measure v  has an  absolutdy contintLOUS  dcnsity,  p,  with support contained in 
(ii)  For  cach  z E lR
ll
, 
r (r  .:~)  U' Z)2d17w)P(w)dw = r  .)Ü (r  U· z)2d17w)P(w)dw  lR+  lB(w) (¡W  lR+  (.  W  lB(w) 
Condition  (ii)  in  the aboye definition  is  fulfilled  if the conditional distributions 17w  do 
not  depend on  w.  This is  the case  if  (A, JL)  = (C x  D, 17  (8)  v)  is  a  product  space, 
in  which  (C,17)  describes the distribution of types of consumers and (D,v)  describes 
the distribution of wealth.  Thus, the simplest case in  which  metonymy holds is  if the 
distribution of types is  the same at all  income levels.  This is  not a necessary condition 
though, and it is also valid in  many other instances.  We  refer the reader to [8]  and [10] 
for a more detailed discussion of metonymy.  Nevertheless, we remark that condition (ii) 
is equivalent to: 
for all i,j, 
Fix now a E A, p E lR
n
,  p > O éLnd  cOllsider the quadratic form defined on sn-l, 
11 
S(n,71,;z;) = L .';¡¡j(n,71)]Ji]1jX¡Xj. 
i,j=l 
(2.5) 
This function  is  eOlltinuous  in  aH  the arguments for  p E  lR~+  ~  From the properties of 
the compensated demand fundion, it follo\Vs  tll<Lt  this fOI'l11  is  llegative semidefinite.  In 
fact, for  Xo  = 7,d1. ... ,  1),  \Ve  have 8(0,1',;1:0) = O.  The eigellvalues of S(a,p,x) have 
the form, 
(2.6) 
12 We define 
and 
'x(n) =. sup  '\2(0,]1)  ~  O. 
pEH++ 
,X = L  'x(a)dll· 
Assume that ,X  < O.  Define also 
w= jw(a)dll E IR.+. 
Consider now  the folluwing quantity 
(2:1) 
(2.8) 
where, if 11'0  denotes the orthogollal projectioll onto the plane {z : XO' z = O},  then  ~ is 
given by 
~ =  inf{1I1I'o(x)1I
2
:  1I;z:1I  =  1.  x· ;z:o? O.  w  IIx - xoll?  3  }. 
f1,2(2w + 1) 
By means uf the qualltity E  we  can make precise the stateinellt that by  imposing 
certaill restrictiollS on  the shape of the densi ty p( w)  the Law  of Demand for a range of 
prices is obtained. 
Theorem 2.6  Lct E = (A,Jt), {f(a,·, ·)}oE.A,W)  be  a markct economy and suppose the 
following hoid: 
(i)  The  Ecol/.omy t:  is 1'eguiar. 
(ii)  T]u~ mftls'/t1'C Jt  is mctonymic. 
(iii)  ,,\( a) < O on  a 8ct  of positi'l1e  mcaStt1'f. 
Let !  be  dcjinfd by  :1.8.  If 
1
2'  'W  p(w)clw < é, 
{w:P'(tu»O} 
(2.9) 
then the  LaUl of Dcmand holds f01'  all prices p, q E  IR~+, unth p :f:.  q. 'Remark .2.7 The number e  appearmg  111  Expression  2.8  depends on  the  de~sity p 
through integration.  As stated, Theorem 2.6 gives only a sufficient condition (whic,h has 
to be checked in each particular case) for  the Law of Demand to hold. 
With further hypotheses it is possible to obtaill a  positiVf~ number e which depends 
only on the set of consumers, A alld  their demand functions  but not on  the possible 
densities p,  for which the measure JL  is metonymic.  Namely, suppose 
Ao =  sup{A(O')  : O'  E A} < O, 
and 
""'o  =  inf{w(O') : O'  E A} > O 
hold.  Then Theorem 2.6 is  still valid for 
e =  mill{~, IAolh"}  > O,  (2.10) 
with 
6 = inf{lIl1'o(x)1I
2 
:  IIxll =  1,  x·  ;z:o  2::  0,  Ilx - x  II  >  Wo  } 
o  - ni(2Wo + 1)  . 
If  this is the case, for a fixed set of COllsumers, A, with regular demand functions f(a,·,·), 
in the sen  se of Theurem 2.6,  it is  possible to COllstruct  metollymic measures JL,  which 
are not  alUlay,<¡  dCC1"ra,<;iug and for  which the Law of Demand hold5. 
Example 2.8  We present next au example of a  fUllction,  p(t), which gives all  idea of 
what killd of distributiollS we  may expect theon'm :Ul to apply to. 
The density distriblltioll is pien'wist' linear as given in  Figure 1.  It attains its peak 
at the poillt too  Suppose \Ve  require tlmt tIJe  total population with income less than to 
be a < 1, and assume that, for that sector, the distribution p is given by p(t) = ato  A 
simple computation shows that given e as in Theorem 2.6, we may take to =  ~:' a =  ~ 
and tbis distribution satisfies J{p'>O} t2p'(t)dt $  c. 
14 p(t) 
to  t 
Figure  1: 
Example 2.9 It is possible to extelld the aboye result to llllimodal distributions. Namely, 
let p( w)  be a ullimodal distribution, which attaillS its peak at the point to E R.  Let 
M =  sup{p'(w) : w E [O, to]}. 
A simple calculatioll is  therefore required to show  that cOllditioll 2.9 in Theorem 2.6 is 
'fied 'f Mt&  ven  1  3  < é. 
Example 2.10  Fillally. \Ve apply Example 2.9 to the case of the lognormal distribution: 
p(:r) = _1_'!'exp(_ (lll:r:  ~  1,)2). 
uJ2;  x  2u'}. 
"Ve find  that this distributioll attaills its  p~ak at the poillt to =  é'_(12  and condition 2.9 
in  2.6  is satisfied for 
_(12 
.F  2  ~  -.-ll+lt+u --.1<.: 
uJ2;  u2 
Remark 2.11  To compare the above result with the existing literature ([9],[10)) we note 
that we  are assuming hel'e  additiollal  regularity cOllditiollS,  llamely,  that all demand 
functiolls  be differelltiable. alld  preferellces  be strictly COllvex  alld  llon-saturated.  In 
15 contrasto we obtaiu the La.w  of Demand for  a.  certain,type of not necessarily, decreasing 
density distributions of income, without ma.king strong assumptions on the Engel curves 
as in [1]. 
As  noted by  M ..  Jerison, it is  not really llecessary in  Theorell1 2.6  that f(  a, p, w) 
be continuous in the first argull1ent.  1  t suffices to assUll1e that f( o, p, w( o)) is integrable 
as a function of the variable o. 
In  contrast, the next result does  l1lükt> use of this hypothesis and it follows  from 
Theorem 2.6 by taking into consideration tlw fact that >'( C\')  is  a continuous function of 
a. 
Theorem 2.12  8uppose the folloUling  hold: 
(i)  Thc  Economy E is regula?". 
(ii)  The.  me.asurc l'  is mdonymic. 
(iii)  There is ao E A, surll that >.(ao) < O. 
Then there is é  > O such that if 
{  w'lp'(w)dw < é, 
J{tu:p'(w»O} 
thc Lall' of Demand holds /01'  all p"iccs ]J.  IJ  E  IR.~+. 
'Ve llotice that Condition (iii), is  a  limitation on  the consull1er's individual pref-
erences rather than one on  dispersion.  However,  it is  enough  that it  be satisfied for 
one consumero  Because, by continuity of >.(0),  it is  then verified for  a set of consumers 
of positive measure.  It  is  easily verified  rOl'  CES utilitiy functions.  Hence Condition 
(iii) is fulfilled as long as tht>rt>  is om' agent in  the economy with CES-type preferences. 
Remark 2.7 applies also here. 
16 3  . MARKET EXCHANQE.ECONO·MIES 
We now apply the ideas in the preceding section to a competitive pure exchange econorny. 
Thus, each trader's inr.ome is  now  given by the market value of his own endowrnent and 
is. therefore, price dependent. 
In  this new context, a market exchange economy will be a triple 
(  (A, l' ), {f  (  0', "  . ) } (tEA, w). 
The only difference with  the previous Section is  that w E  Ll (A, IR~) n C(A, R~), now 
represents initial endowments.  ratlwr thall  income.  In  other words.  we  suppose that 
each consumer (\'  E A has an  (~lHloW111ellt w(O')  E  IR.~. 
We let 
w  = L  w(a)dp. 
denote the mean endowment. Total demand is  defined by 
F(]J) = L  f(a,]J,]J . w(a))dp.,  (3.11) 
and the market. excess demand fundion is  then 
Z(p) = F(p) - w.  (3.12) 
As  before, we assume Z(p) to be a el function and suppose that one may differentiate 
with respect to p under the integral signo 
It 1S  imllH>diately St'en  tha.t  Z(p) is  homogeneous  01'  degree O.  bounded below  by 
;;.,  and satisfies Walras' law:  JI' Z(p) =  O.  A positive price ll" E  IR.~+ will  be called an 
equilibrium prin> if Z(p*) =  O. 
We  now  introduce the concept of metollymy in  this setting.  For.c;  E  R~ we let 
G(s) be the set of agellts in  the economy whose iuitial eudowmellt is s, i.e. 
G(.s) = {O'  E A:  w(a) = .c;}. 
17 The measure l' induces a  conditional  distributioll, say  17s  on  each 9(8)  '~IQng with a 
measure v on 1R~, such that if h E L  1 (A, 1R.~), thell 
1 
hdp. =  f  (f  hd17s )dll , 
.A  in  ...  iG(s) 
Recall that the Slutsky equation now reads, 
afí  ,  8f¡  -a  (cr,p,p' w(cr)) = "¡jl(o,p,p.w(o)) + (Wj(cr)  - h):¡I(n,p,p.w(Q))' 
~  ~ 
Definition 3.1  lile:  say  that  the:/1I.fa8Urf  JL  zs  m.cionym.ic  if the:  folloUJing  conditions 
hold: 
(i)  The  mea..  ... ure  I1  has  an  absolutcly  continuous  dcnsity,  denoted  by g( s),  supporled 
.  ]Rn  m  +. 
(ii)  Por k =  1, ... , n, for all y E IR.
tI  and for all priccs p, 
Note that if \Ve  assume that the measure JL  is  a product-type measure of the form 
l' =  71  x v, as in  the precedillg Sectioll, thell part (ii)  follows  from part (i).  Namely, 
(A, p.) = (C x D, 71®v), where, now (C, 17)  describes the "types" of consumers alld (D, v) 
the allocation of initial endowments among each type.  As in  the price-indepelldellt case, 
it is easy to verify that condition (ii) is  t'quivalent to the following one 
for all i,j, k 
Our conditiollS  011  the shape of the distributio11  of initi,Ll  endowments will  be 
expressed by requirt'ments un the derivatives 01"  lhe density g(8).  Considero 
B+ - {,  JI"{tI.  iJg( ..  ~)  O} 
k  - .sEu+,  ü·  >  . 
·'lk 
18 We will  make use of tbe following rpsult, 
Given a vector e E  IR~ denote by  H (t:)  =  {;l:  E IR" : J: . e =  O}.  The following is  a 
variant of lemma 6.1  in  [1:3], 
Lernrna 3.2 ([13])  Lct  F  :  IR~ -t IR
fl  be.  a el  jiLnction,  H  a conc  contained in  1R~+ 
and e  any vcctor in  IR~.  Then the folloUling  arf cquilJalcnt: 
(i)  For  C'Vf1'Y  p E H  the  Jacobia1/.  l/la17'Í;¡;  DF(p)  i.<;  negativf scmidcfinite on H(e). 
(ii)  (p - q). (F(p) - F(q)) ::; O fOl'  C1Jcry  p,e¡  E H  Ulith  P =1=  q and p' e = q' e. 
We can now state a restricted version of tbe Law of Demand. This will be enough, 
though, to guarantee lIniqlleness and will also provide stability of equilibrium in a closed 
cone of prices. 
In order to exhibit the ftexibility oí our methods, we  will consider now  a slightly 
different variant of hypothesis  (iii)  in  Theorem 2.6.  Namely,  we  suppose that, for  all 
consumers, the rallk oí the Slutsky nmtrix is  the maximum it may have, i.e.  we assume 
its rank is  exactly n-l. In  this case,  the eigenvalues of S( Q, p, x) givell  by 2.5,  now 
have the formo 
(3.13) 
Consider a dosed cone oí prices H e  1R~+. We  Jet  llOW 
(3.14) 
•  '1.J n L'11-1  .  t  L'k'  I  f'  slllce  n  .:1+  IS compac.  1  '(~\Vlse. \Ve  «~  lIW 
,,\ = L"\(  (\' )cl¡t 
19 .~nd 
Consider é  defined by 
v =  inf  p' w. 
pE8~-1 
E =  IAlv  > O, 
nllwlh 
where for  z E R'\ 1j=lh  = Lk=l 1=lk'  We have, 
Proposition 3.3  JI the lollowing hold: 
(i)  The Economy  i.~  regular. 
(ii)  The measurf J1.  is melonymic. 
(iii)  For every consumer, the Slut.r;ky  matrix has rank n-l. 
(3.15) 
Let 'Ji e  R~+ be  a closed cone  01 priCfs.  Lel E > O be  dejil1ed  by Equatio71  3.15.  JI for 
all k =  1, ... ,n 
1,  11  11
2 iJg(.<;)  l· < :-
+.5  ;:1  (.s _  .... , 
Bk  USk 
(3.16) 
then the excess demand ¡Ilndion satisjies, 
(p - q). (Z(p) - Z(q)) < O  (3.17) 
for all price.'1 p, q E 'H.  with l'  =f q  and 11' W = q . w. 
Remark 3.4 The prool' 01' Pl'Opositioll :3.:J shows that collditiol1 (iii) in it can be replaced 
by the following one: 
(  i  i  i) A  (  (\')  < O on a  .<;C.t  o  f lJositi'/1e  meastu'('. 
Remark 3.5 The numbel' é  appearillg in  Proposition :l.a  is  computed usil1g  data ob-
tailled from  the Slutsky  IllCLtl'ix  of all  l~OnSUll)(~I·S.  Hence,  equatioll  :3.16  restricts the 
20 shape of the graph  of lhe .density dfstribution of income  ac,o~ding to. the consumers'  .  . 
taste. 
As  observed in  Remark 2.7, the qualltity E depends, in  principie on  the density p. 
It is also easy to verify from  the pl"oof of PropositioB :3.:3  that if 
AO  = sup{A(o) : o  E A} < O, 
and 
Wo  =  inf{w(o) : o  E A} > O, 
then the Proposition holds for 
which does Bot  depend 011  p. 
IAolv 
E = nllwolh 
Remark 3.6  \Ve  observe ([1:3]),  that :3.17  cannot hold  fOl"  all  prices.  Indeed, let p  E 
R:+ such that Z(p)  ~ R:. There is q E R~+  such that q·Z(p) < O.  For A E R consider 
(Ap - q)(Z(Ap) - Z(q))  - Ap(Z(Ap) - Z(q)) - q' (Z(Ap) - Z(q)) 
=  Ap(Z(p) - Z(q» - q' Z(p). 
For small enough A the last term can be made positive. 
However.  \Ve  can  still  use  this  result  to  show  that if the distribution of initial 
endowments  is  consistent  with  :3.16,  then  there is  él.  unique equilibrium.  Let aR:+ 
denote the boundary of 1R~+, i.e.  iJ1R~+ = {p  ~  O:  for  some O  :::;  i  :::;  n,  Pi =  O}. 
Theorem 3.7  A.ssumr  Ihr  follo"llliu!/  hold: 
(i)  Thc  Economy is  1'rgttla1'. 
(ii)  The  mr.astu'C  J.I.  is  mcto1LymÍt~. 
21 (iv)  For every C07Lsumer,  the Slutsky matrix has mnk n-l. 
Then therc is e > O such that if  for all  J.:  = 1, ... , n 
h 
1111
:/}f/(·5)¡.  -
<;  --(  o.;  <. 
Bt··  ().sk·  - '-, 
there.  is a uniquf  fq'llilib1'ÚL'In  price,  p  •. 
Furtherm01'c,  thC1'C  is closcd couc of p1'iCfS H e  lR~+, containing p., such that for 
all q E H, which is not collinca1' mith p.,  mc  have that p  • . Z(q) > O (thc  weak  axiom of 
revealed preference for the aggregate holds in H). 
We are restricted to a closed cune to guarantee to ourselves that the substitution 
effect is  boullded away  from O for  at least one consumero  Thus, assumillg this, we can 
dispose of the con  e H.  Recall the definition of -\( n) given in :3.1:3. 
Theorem 3.8  Let thc following hold: 
(i)  The Economy '¡s  1'(q1tla1'. 
(ii)  Thc mca..5m'c  JL  is melonymic. 
(iii)  If {Pn}n e lR~+ COnt1ergcs  to l' E alR~+, filen 
(iv)  There.  is no E A, such tilat -\( nu) < O. 
22 Then therc is e > O such that if  f01'  all  ~ = 1, ... , n 
1 
2Dg(s) 
+ 11.0;11  ~d.o;  ::; e, 
Bk  U·'lk 
the1'e  is a uniquc equilib1'ium ¡n'ice, p..  Furthe1'm01'e,  f01'  all q E  lR~+, not collinear with 
p., toe  hatJc  that p  • . Z(q) > O (the weak axiom of revealed prefcrence for the aggregate). 
4  STABILITY AND A  TATONNEMENT 
PROCESS 
In  this Section we suggest a pricp adjustment process which, for  the economies consid-
ered, converges to the unique pquilihrium.  COllsider the standard tatonnement process 
p(t) = Z(p(t)),  (4.18) 
where p  = *  i.e.  prices move in  the direction of excess demando 
It is  a standard result that if the weak  axiom of reve.aled  preference as stated in 
Theorem :3.8  holds  the the aggregate,  thell  the unique equilibrium price is  a globally 
stable equilibriull1 point of the system of differential equations 4.18.  Thus we can state, 
Proposition 4.1  If the following hold: 
(i)  The Economy is reguLm'. 
(ii)  The mensure JL  is mcfonymú·. 
(iii)  There is (\'0 E A, .,,;uch  lhal.  A(nu)  < O. 
Tllen thf.7'C  is e > O Buril  that if  f01'  all k = 1, ..• , n 
h  11  11
28g(s) 1  -
.'1  (:  S  < e, 
+  Ü  - BI;  . ·'1k the  uniquc .equilibrium  p1'icc  gitJfn  m  Thc01'C1n  ..  1.8  is  asymptotically stable  un.der  the 
tátonnement 4.18. 
5  FINAL REMARKS 
We have presented a model of apure e.xehange eeonomie system in which total market 
demand is  monotone in  priees.  This allows  ane  to obtain  results on  uniqueness and 
stability of the equilibriull1 priet:'o 
The aim of our work has been to do this through as realistic hypotheses as possible 
on the distribution of total expenditure and, at the same time, without imposing too 
restrictive conditions on cOllsumers' preferences.  We WillllOW  compare our results with 
the existing literature. 
With respect to the line followed  in  [9],  [la]  and [1],  the novelty here is  that we 
allow for some illcreasing densities of income without making assumptions on the Engel 
curves.Our methods can be further extended to the more general setting in wich wealth 
is determined by the market price of illitial endowments. 
The alternative approach  to the problem of  aggregation  of demand. followed  in 
[5],  makes  rather strong  assumptions  on  both,  the consumers  preferellces  (aggregate 
desirability) and  the distribution of 'c.hamcteristics' (the conditional densities in each 
class of o:-transfOl'm are all the same, and aH  tlw agents in that dass have equal wealth). 
In return, the author obta.ius tha.t oue does not lleed to make any reference to individual 
rationality other than homogeneity a.ml  Walras' law. 
hl the near future, it is  hoped that empirica.l estimates will  be obtained in order 
to test wbether the observable distriblltions sa.tisfy  the hypotheses proposed here.  It is 
also hoped that these findings  will  be extended so  as to inc.orporate productioll, and a 
temporal framework. 
24 APPENDIX 
Let  S~-l denote the positive orthant of the ullit sphere, S~-l =  {x E R++ :  l/xII  = 
1}, where n is  the llumber of commodities. 
We will use the followillg  rOllvelltiollal  llotatioll:  R~ =  {z E  R' : z  ~ O, z  :f:.  O} 
1R~+ = {z  E  R'  :  Z¡  >  O  for  all i  =  1, ... , [}.  Similarly,  we  denote the usual  inner 
product in R
71  by < ;r, y >= ;['.y.  We will  need the following norms in R
71
:  I/zl/ = ..jL¡ Z[ 
and IIzllt = L¡ Iz;!'  The inequality 11=111  '$  JñIl=1I  is a  standard resulto 
We will also make use of the following, 
Lernrna 1  Lr.t 9  E C1(R'" R).  Lft G  bE:  a convex liubsr.t  01 R
7I  and let a, bE G  with 
g(a) =  O.  Suppose lor all x  E G,  and i =  1, ...  , n,  11  ~II < Q.  Thcn 
Proof of lernrna 1: 
Let h(t) =  g(bt +  (1  - t)a).  Clearly, h(O) =  g(a) =  O.  h(l) =  g(b), so 
1& 
<  <l' L IIb¡  - adl 
i=1 
o 
25 Proof of Theorem 2.6: . 
From the remark following  lemina 2.4 we only haw to show  that the .Jacobian matrix 
DF(p) is negative definite.  By  the Slutsky equation, for  each a  E A, 
af¡  Df¡ 
OPi (a, p, t) =  ,sij( a, p, t) - Ji  al l(o,p,I). 
Let y E R
7I  and define 
8(p, y)  (A.2) 
A(p,y)  (A.3) 
Thus,  F(p) is  monotone if and ollly if for  all  prices p E  lR~+ alld  y  E  lR
7I
,  fi(p, y) < 
A(p, y).  We  will show  this indirectly. 
Let p E R~+ ami a  E A.  Define 
and the matrices, 
S(a,p)  - {st(a,p)}ij 
A  (  a, p)  - {  arj ( a, p)} jj. 
We consider now  the qUéLdratic forms, 
S(p, J:)  -
-
A(p,x)  -
-
S(O', p, :c)  -
-
L  < 8(a, p):c, x > ([IJ.  (AA) 
t  f  ,'1jj(a'¡J,w(a))x¡:ciPilJidIL 
i,j=) lA 
i < A(a, 7)):1:, x > dlJ.  (A.5) 
JI  ()  1,.  L ¡ h(a,p,w(a)) ;:ll(o,p,w(a));L"¡;CiP¡PidIL 
i,j=1  A  vt 
< 8(a,p)x,x >  (A.6) 
JI 
L ,'1ij(a, P, w(  a))PiPiXiXj. 
¡,i=1 
26 . We  tlrst note that the  t~leorem foll?ws  ir  ~e can.  sl~ow that foro aH  p E  R~+  4Ild 
. ...  '  .. 
x  E  lR
n
,  S(p, x) - A(p,:1:)  < °  ,  where S and  A are given  by  equations AA and A.5. 
Because, given y E IR
II
,  Jet  ;1:i  =  .lYi, then 
P  • 
.  S'(p,y) - A(p,y) = 8(p,x) - A(p,x) < O. 
It is also enough to prove that S(p,x) - A(p,x) < °  for x E 8
n
-
1 = {x E Ir' : IIxll = l}. 
For  then,  ir  z  E  lR
n 
\  {O},  there is  7'  =  IIzll  =1= °  such  that  x  =  ~z E  sn-1,  and 
S(p,z) - A(p,z) =  7·2(S(p,:z;)  - A(p,x)) < O. 
Since the eigenvaJues uf S'( 0,]J,;1:) in  A.G are giwn in Equatioll 2.6, we see that there 
is  an orthonormaJ transformatioll  M  E O(n), taking Xo  =  *(1, ... ,1) to (1,0, ...  ,0) 
and such that MS(a.,p)M-I is  the diagonalmatrix 
(
O O  ...  O) 
~  A2  ~: ~  O 
°  An 
Let  A(a) =  sup{A2(a,p) : P E  IR.~+} ::;  O.  Let  y =  Mx and denote by  7r  and 7ro, 
the orthogonal pl'Ojections onto the planes {z : Z1  = O}, alld {z : xo·z = O}, respectively. 
Note that M o 7ro =  7r o M. For each (a,p) E A x  R~+, we have, 
L ,si,í(a.,p,w(n))pipí:CiXí  =  < S(a,p)x,x > 
¡,í 
=  < 5'M-Iy, M-Iy > 
=  < MSM-Iy,y > 
=  2  2  A2(n, P)Y2 + ... + An(a,p)Yn 
::;  2  2  A2(a,p)(Y2 + ... + y,J 
< 
2  2  A(a)(Y2 + '"  + y,J 
=  A(a) < 7r(Y), 7r(Y)  > 
=  A(n) < 7r(M:c),7r(M:z;)  > 
=  A(a) < M7ro(:c), M7ro(;z;)  > 
=  A(O) < 7ro(x),7ro(x) > .  (A.7) 
27 Let 
A = L  A(a)dJl. 
Since A(a)  ~ O and "(a)  < O on  a  set of  positive measure,  we  have that  A < O By 
integrating, we have that, 
(A.S) 
We let 
h =  inf{lI7l"u(:z:)1I
2
:  IIxll =  1,  .z:.  ;co  ~  O, 
w  IIx - xoll  ~  3  } 
n2(2W +  1) 
and define é  > O by 
e =  min{~,  IAI8}  > O,  (A.9) 
where 
w = J  w(a)dIL. 
Thus, for all p E  1R~+ if IIx - xoll?  .1  W_  ,lIxll = 1, and x·  Xo ? O then S(p, x) < -é. 
n~(2"'+l) 
Suppose now  that p satisfies  fp'>o t2 pi < é. 
We study first the term A(1),:C).  We  have that 
71  ,  iJj¡ 
A(p,:l:)  =  2:  {jj ,Jtl<",I',..,(o));l:¡XiP¡PidJl 
i,i=l lA  (. 
aj¡  - L  (2: h:Z:jPi)(2;,  Ot  l(o'I',..,(o))x¡p¡)dJl 
J  t 
1 ¡ ü (2:'  )2  - - - j'x'1)'  d'L  :2  A  üt  .  J  J  3  r 
J 
11 i  (J2:'  2  - -:- (  7'(  j'X'P') dr¡dp(t)(lt.  :2  ~ G(t) dt  j  J  J  J 
In  particular, we  have that A(p, :ro) =  ~. 
Siilce the measure l' is metonymic, twic(-! the last term in  A.lO eqllals 
(A.IO) By  i.~ltegrating by parts this  i~ the same as, 
-1  f  C2:..ljXj]Jj)2dTlIP'(t)dt, 
R+ 1G(I)  j 
which can be decomposed into, 
(A.U) 
Now note that in case lI;c - :coll  <  ~;;¡,  ,  we must have that A(p, x) > 0, because, 
11  ~(2w+l) 
from Equation A.ll, fOl"  i =  1, ... , n, 
IOA I  < 
OXi 
- 2w+2e 
<  2w +  1, 
where we have used that 
~  -
= 
-
-
L  W(O)dJL 
1 ¡  td711P(Lt 
R+  G(I) 
1  tp(t)dt 
f4 
-~ 1  t
2p'(t)dt > O. 
2  R+ 
(A.12) 
Equatioll  A.12  holds also  fOl"  ;1:  in  the open  unit  hall  (\Ve  need  this in order to apply 
Lemma 1).  Thus. ir A(]J,.t) =  O,  thell, by  L(~Il1J11a 1, 
A(p, xo) = w < (2w + l)y'ñllxo - xII. 
n 
29 So, Ilxo - xii>  f  W  • 
.  n  (2w+l) 
w  Hence,  we may assume that  1I;z: - xoll  >  ¡  The integral over the region 
n!(2w+l) 
{t : p'(t) :::;  O}  appearing in A.II is  positive and will  cause no problems.  Thus we will 
concentrate on the region {t  : p'( t)  > O}. 
Fix a price p E  lR~+ ami define 
=  ~ f  f  (2: l¡x¡p¡)2d77Ip'(t)dt 
2 J{I:pl(!»O) JG(!)  i 
1j  l"  2'  =  -:- (L.-I¡XiPi)  d7JIP (t)dt. 
2  {1:pl(I)$O}  (;(1)  i 
Note,  that A-(p,x) ?  O.  The theorem will  follow  if we  can show  that  IA+(p,x)1  < 
IS(p,x)l, for  appropriate x.  Sillce the quadratic forms  8  and  A+  satisfy S(p, -x) -
S(p, x) and A+(p, -.z:) = A+(p,:z:)  it is  enough  to show  that S(p, x) + A+(p, x) < O for 
x  in the half sphere Sg-I =  {=  E 8
n
- 1  :  :1:0' =  ? O}.  Thus, we  may restrict ourselves to 
x  lying on 8;-1 and IIx - xoll?  i  W  •  But then, 
n  (2w+l) 
IA+(p, x)1  - ~ r  r CE, f¡(a, p, t)x¡p¡)2d7Jtp'dt 
...  Jpl>O JO(t)  i 
(A.13) 
(A.14) 
Hence, from the way e  was rhosen, we  have that IS(p,:r)l > A+(p,:c).  Therefore, 
8(p,.r) - A(J1,:¡:)  =  S'(p,:r) - A+(p,.l:) - A-(p,x) 
<  ,)'(p,x) - A+(p,:¡:) 
<  o. 
and the proof is finished. 
'vVe start, now the prelimillaries to prove Pl'Oposition :1.:3.  Let 
" 
{  lRn"  - .)  2}  H"  =  = E  : L.-]J¡:I:¡..J¡ =  0,=1- + ... +  =" = 1 . 
i=1 
o 
(A.15) 
Recall that 1ro denotes the orthogonal projection frol1l  lR
n  onto the plane {z : z·xo = O}. 
We have, 
:30 Lemma 2  Irz E H p1  thf.l~ 1I11"0(z)1I  ~ *. 
Proof of lemma 2: 
First, 1I"0(z) = =  - (z' xu}xo,  so 
00 the other hand,  ::  . Xo  = cos(::, xo).  Thus,  the maximum of (z . XO)2  is  attained 
when  the angle between  z  and  Xo  is  minimum,  i.e.  on  the edges of the positive or-
thant.  By symmetry we may assume that = = (O, ::'2, ••. , =11-1, JI - Li~}  zl).  A simple 
computation shows that =  .  ;z:o  attains its maximum. fol'  Z'2  == ... =  Zn =  ';:-1' So, 
and the Lemma follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3: 
'2  1 
(= . :z:o)  ~ 1 - -
11 
o 
By Lemma 3.2 it is enough to show that for each p E 'H.,  D F(p) is negative semidefinite 
on H(w).  5ince DF(p) is  homogeneolls of degree -1 in  p.  it is enough to show this for 
p E 'H. n 5'+-1 . 
From now  on, we fix  p E 'H. n 5'+-1, consider, 
11 
S(p,;¡;}  =  L S'¡j(p)P¡I'.iXj;/:j 
i .. I=1 
11 
A(l',.r)  =  L  A¡j(l')Pillj;/:¡;¡;j, 
¡,j=1 
where Sij(a,p,p' w(a)) éLre  the entries of the Slutsky's matrix. 
As  before \Ve let 
-\(0') =  sUPPAO,]I) : p E 'H. n  S~-I} < O, 
:11 
(A.16) 
(A.17) .  •  'LJ n cn-l .  L'k'  1 fi  SlDce .H  .:;1+  IS c()mpact.  I 'eWIse,  we (e he 
A = i A(a)dJL. 
Then by  Lemma 2 aud Formula A.8  in  the proof of Theorem 2.6,  it follows  that, for 
x  E HT " 
.  A 
S(p,x) ::; -. 
n 
Note also, that 
v =  inf  p' w =  iuf  IIwll cos(p,w) > O, 
pes~-l  pes~-l 
because it follows from metonymy that w is  in  the interior of  lR~. 
Let 
lA/V 
e =  / /  > 0,  n/wh 
where for z E lRtl,  IIzlh  =  Ek=l Izlk'  The Proposition is  a cOllsequellce of Claims 1,  2 
alld 3 below. 
Recall the definition of Hp  in  A.15, 
Claim 1  For rach;1:  E HpI  S(p,;l:) +  A(p,;z:) < O. 
Let x E H-p,  Y¡ =  x¡p¡  aud define 
a(p) = p' w  2:  v  > O. 
From the remark befo re  Claim  1 Wf':if't' that (t(p)S(I',x) <  ~~. 
011  tbe otber halld,  Wf' have thal, 
aj;· 
a(p)A(p,x)  =  a(¡J) 2: 1  (Wj  - JJ  ')t'y¡yjdJL 
i,j  A  (.  . 
aJ 
- a(p)  {  < W  - f,y >< ""';l,y > dJL  lA.  ut 
:J2 =  LWIe  f  <W-j,y><Pk~j,y;dll 
le  J A  ui 
_  oj  =  LWk fu  f.  <,<;-j,y><pk-:),y>dr¡sg(s)ds 
le  JH+  JO(a)  oi 
Note that 
iJj(a,p,p· ,'1)  8j(a,p,p· s) 
!l  =  Pk  !lt  '  U.<lk  u 
so  we can write the Iast term as 
which is  the same as 
1  iJ  2: WIc(  [n  [  Yk  < ,'1  - j,y > dr¡sg(,c¡)ds  - -2  [u  f  !l  < s - j,y >2 dr¡sg(s)ds). 
Ic  JR+ JG(s)  JR+ JG(B)  USk 
But the first term vallishes because 
L  ':;;leYk =  W • y =  0, 
le 
sillce x E Hp•  Using now  metollymy (Lnd  iutegratioll by  parts, we get 
Á l
a  (  )  :2  )  Á 1  2  8g(s)  ~  <  s - j  ,y >  (lr¡sg(·~ (ls  =  - < (s - J),y >  dr¡s-8-ds,  R+  G(s) uSIe  R+  G(s)  Sic 
and, as before, we  have to worry onIy about the regions Bt =  {,c¡  E R+ : 8:1:)  > O}. 
Define, 
We first  bound the illuer integrando  Note that 
- (L  SjPj:Cj - 2: jj(  a, p, P . s )pjXj)2 
j  j 
"  :2"  :2  <  (L..,-SjPjXj)  +(L..,!i(o,p,p·S)PjXj) 
J  J 
J  ) 
(A.IB) he.cause o  ~ xf  ~ 1. a11(1  p . f(  a;  p, 1) • .c;)  =  p . ....  Since we  are assuming, p E 5+-1, we 
have that p. s  ~ IIsll.  Thus, 
(A.19) 
A+(p,x)  <  é  ¿Wk 
k 
- éllwlj¡ 
<  1,\lv 
n 
<  la(]J )S(p, x) I  (A.20) 
It follows  tbat a(p)(S(p,;z:) + A(p,x)) < O.  Hellce S(p,x) + A(p,x) < O as advertised. 
Claim 2  For all x E R" such that L¡P¡X¡W¡ = O,Ulf.  havf.  that S(p,x) + A(p, x) < O. 
Let x E R" such that L¡P¡X¡W¡  = O.  Let  :;  =  1I~lIx E Hv.  Thell from Claim 1, we have 
that S(p,x) +  A(p,x) = IIxIl2(S(1',z) +  A(1),Z)) < O. 
Let us define now  the following quantitit.>.s, 
n 
.~(J>, y)  =  L S¡j(p )Y¡Yj 
¡,j=l 
(A.21 ) 
and 
n 
A(p,y)  - L  A¡j{p)Y¡Yj, 
i,i=l 
where S¡j(p) and A¡j(p) are defined,respedively, by equations A.16 and A.li. We have 
the following 
:14 · Claim 3  For all y E JR;¡  s'Uch  that L¡ y¡W¡  ~  0, wc  ha ve  that .S'{p"  y) +  '.A(p, y) < O. 
Let y E 1R
n  such that L¡ y¡W¡  =  O.  Let  X¡  =  y¡fP¡.  Then 
L p¡x¡W¡ = L y¡Wi =  O, 
,  , 
t  I 
and, by Claim 2, 
O> S(p,x) + A(p,x) =  .S'(y) + A(y) 
which finishes  the.  proof of the theol'em.  o 
Proof of Theorem 3.7: 
It is  a  standard resuJt  (see  [:3]),  that if Z(p)  is  continuous, bounded below,  and 
satisfies Walras' law and property (iv), then there is  p*  E  1R~+ su  eh that Z(p*) = O. 
Next,  we  note that, by  (iv),  there is  6  > O sueh  that if d(p, aR~+} ~ 6,  then 
Z(p) # O.  Let 1í be a dosed cone, such that if p E R~+  \ 1í, then d(p, aR~+)  ~  6.  In 
particular, the set of equilibrium prices is contained in 1í. 
It follows from  Proposition :3.:1.  that thel'f" is é, such that if for  k =  1, ...  , n 
then the excess demand fundion satisfies, 
(p - q)' (Z(p) - Z(q)) < O 
for all prices p '# q E 1í with p . W = q . W. 
Fix  éLll  equiJibl'iulll  price  ¡/"  E  1í,  and  Jet  lJ  E  1í,  not  collinear  with  p*.  Let 
A =  ,,~.~ > O.  Then Ap" # q and 
-Ap· . Z(q) = (Ap* - tI) • (Z(Ap*) - Z(q)) < 0, since Z(AP*)  =  Z(¡n =  o,  q' Z(q)  =  o  éLlld  lhe.  re.stricted  1l10110tQIÜcity" property of  .  ..  . 
Propositioll 3.3. 
This implies that  ]1*  • Z  (q)  > O for  any other q  E  'H,  llot  collinear with p*.  In 
particular, Z (  q)  =f  O for  any other q  E 'H,  not collillear wi th ]J".  Therefore, p* is  the 
only possible equilibrium price in 'H and hence in  1R~+.  o 
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